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STATE OF UTAH, 
et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 930135-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPELLEES' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Pursuant to this Court's order dated March 29, 1994, the State 
and City Appellees submit the following joint brief in response to 
Points I and II of Day's Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DAY'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT FAILS BECAUSE SHE 
SEEKS A REMEDY AGAINST THE STATE WHICH IS 
UNPROTECTED BY THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE 
Day seeks a remedy against the state that is unprotected by 
the open courts clause; therefore, her constitutional challenge to 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") fails. Day 
challenges section 63-30-7(2) of the Act, which she contends 
deprives her of a statutory remedy against the state that was 
provided as a "substitute" for a common law remedy she claims 
existed against Trooper Colyar. This challenge fails for several 
reasons. First, as discussed in detail in Point II below, the 
1 
premise that Day had a common law remedy against Trooper Colyar is 
erroneous. However, this Court need not reach the issue of the 
common law immunity of Trooper Colyar because, as discussed in 
Point I.A. below, the alleged "substitute" remedy Day seeks against 
the state never in fact existed. Furthermore, as discussed in 
Point I.B. below, even if such a "substitute" remedy existed, the 
open courts clause affords no protection of the remedy Day seeks 
against the state. 
A. The So-Called "Substitute" Remedy Day Seeks Against The 
State Never Existed Under The Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
Day's open courts challenge to section 63-30-7(2) fails 
because her premise that the Governmental Immunity Act previously 
provided a remedy against the state for her injuries is incorrect. 
As discussed at pages 24-25 of the State's opening brief, section 
63-30-7 was originally enacted in 1965 as part of the original Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
As originally enacted, sections 63-30-3 and 63-30-7 of the Act 
retained governmental immunity for the operation of emergency 
vehicles. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3 & -7 (1968) . Original section 
63-30-3 provided: "Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any 
injury which may result from the activities of said entities 
wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function." Original section 63-30-7 provided: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation 
2 
by any employee of a motor vehicle or other equipment 
while in the scope of his employment; provided, however, 
that this section shall not apply to the operation of 
emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-
6-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86, 
Laws of Utah, 1961. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (1968) (emphasis added) . See 1965 Laws of 
Utah 139, attached as Addendum A. Since the waiver of immunity 
provided under section 63-30-7 did not apply to injuries caused by 
the operation of emergency vehicles, the general immunity provision 
of section 63-3 0-3 did apply. Thus, under the original Act, 
governmental entities were immune from liability for injuries 
caused by the operation of emergency vehicles such as the injuries 
for which Day seeks recovery in this case. 
In 1990, section 63-30-7 was amended to add subsection (2), 
which provided as follows: 
(2)(a) All governmental entities employing peace 
officers retain and do not waive immunity from liability 
for civil damages for personal injury or death or for 
damages to property resulting from the collision of a 
vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator 
of the law who is being, has been, or believes he is 
being or has been pursued by a peace officer employed by 
the governmental entity in a motor vehicle. 
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor 
imply that this immunity was ever previously waived or 
this liability specifically or implicitly recognized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). As 
stated in subsection 2(b), the 1990 amendment of section 63-30-7 
was expressly not intended to change the existing law concerning 
the state's liability for injuries caused by collisions with 
vehicles under police pursuit. In fact, the 1990 amendment was 
intended merely to clarify the legislature's original intent in the 
3 
face of a perceived legal trend in California to assert claims for 
injuries arising from such collisions. See Senate debate, Senator 
Richard J. Carling, S.B. 194, February 14, 1990. 
Therefore, contrary to Day's contention, the state has always 
been immune from Day's claims and no remedy against the state has 
ever been provided -- as a "substitute" for a common law remedy 
against government employees or otherwise -- for Day's claims. 
This Court should therefore reject Day's contention that she 
was unconstitutionally deprived of such a substitute remedy and 
affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Day's claims. 
B. The Open Courts Clause Does Not Protect The Remedy Day 
Seeks Against The State 
1. The open courts clause does not require the state 
to create a substitute remedy 
Even if such a substitute remedy for Day's injuries ever 
existed against the state under the Act, it would not be protected 
by the open courts clause.1 While the open courts clause may 
invalidate a statute that abrogates a common law remedy, and an 
open courts challenge to a statute may be defeated by a showing 
that an adequate substitute or alternative remedy exists, the open 
*As discussed in Point VII of the State's opening brief, 
absent an open courts violation, the constitutionality of section 
63-30-7 must be measured under a minimum scrutiny test and the 
burden remains on Day to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of 
section 63-30-7. See McCorvey v. Utah State Dep't of Transp. 225 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah November 11, 1993) ("Because no right 
existed at common law . . . , the legislature is free to limit the 
state's liability in that area without implicating the open courts 
clause and its concomitant heightened scrutiny."). Day has not 
analyzed section 63-30-7 under a minimum scrutiny test in either 
her opening or reply brief. Therefore, her due process and equal 
protection claims should also be rejected. 
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courts clause does not, as Day would have it, require the 
legislature to provide such a substitute remedy. 
As first set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.. Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), a two-part analysis 
applies to challenge to a statute under the open courts clause: 
First, section 11 [the open courts clause] is satisfied 
if the law provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of 
action may be justified only if there is a clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. 
Id. at 680. If neither an adequate substitute remedy nor a 
sufficient justification for the abrogation of the original remedy 
is found, then the statute abrogating the original remedy is 
invalid. Thus, in Berry, the Utah Supreme Court held the product 
liability statute of repose unconstitutional where no substitute 
remedy was provided for the existing remedy abrogated by the 
statute and where no adequate justification existed for the 
abrogation of the existing remedy. 
Conversely, where a substitute for a pre-existing remedy is 
available, no open courts violation can be established. Thus, in 
Payne v. Mvers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987), the Court rejected 
the plaintiffs' open courts challenge to section 63-30-4(4) of the 
Governmental Immunity Act where the Act provided a remedy against 
the state for their negligence claim and the plaintiffs had failed 
to file a notice of claim against the state. 
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Under the Berry analysis, the "constitutional interest" or 
"existing remedy" protected by the open courts clause in this case 
is Day's claimed common law remedy against Trooper Colyar. The 
only provision of the Act which would affect such a remedy is 
section 63-30-4(4), which limits the personal liability of 
government employees to circumstances involving fraud or malice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (1993). 
Under Berry, if section 63-30-4(4) abrogated an existing 
common law remedy against Trooper Colyar, and if (1) no adequate 
substitute remedy were provided by the Act and (2) no sufficient 
justification existed for the abrogation of the existing remedy, 
then section 63-30-4(4) would be unconstitutional under the open 
courts clause.2 In those circumstances, aside from any question 
of the severability of section 63-30-4(4) from the Act, Day's pre-
existing common law remedy against the law enforcement officers 
would in effect be reinstated. 
Rather than pursuing any remedy against Trooper Colyar 
personally, however, Day apparently prefers the deep pocket of the 
state. Thus, Day contends that the open courts clause obligates 
the legislature to retain an alleged substitute remedy against the 
state. This argument is a radical departure from any existing open 
courts case law and is unsupported even by dicta from any such case 
2Because Day does not challenge the constitutionality of 
section 63-30-4(4), defendants do not address here the validity of 
that provision under the open courts clause. 
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law.3 
Contrary to Day's contention, the Utah Supreme Court has 
explicitly recognized that "[a]rticle I, section 11 does not 
guarantee a right to sue the state when it acts in a governmental 
function." McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 225 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
See also id. at 6 ("Because no right existed at common law to 
recover from the state for injuries arising out of the state's 
maintenance of public roadways, the legislature is free to limit 
the state's liability in that area without implicating the open 
courts clause and its concomitant heightened scrutiny."); 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 372 (Utah 1989) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("The [governmental function] test also 
identifies where the constitutional right of a person to have a 
remedy for personal injury begins under Article I, section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution as against a governmental agency, and where 
the governmental right to immunity from such lawsuits stops.") 
As conceded by Day, Trooper Colyar was engaged in a 
governmental function in pursuing and continuing to pursue Floyd. 
Thus, the open courts clause in no way limits the legislature's 
power to define the state's liability under the circumstances of 
this case. Where Day cannot gain access to the taxpayers resources 
through the front door, her attempt to obtain such access through 
3It is precisely because this novel argument is such a radical 
departure from any previous open courts analysis seen by the State 
that the State could not have reasonably anticipated it from the 
mere fact that Day raised an open courts clause challenge to the 
Act in her opening brief. 
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the back door should be rejected. 
2. To require the legislature to provide a substitute 
remedy would usurp the legislative function 
Moreover, to require the legislature to provide a substitute 
remedy against the state, even under the authority of the open 
courts clause, would be to usurp legislative power and violate the 
principles of judicial restraint and separation of powers. The 
Utah Constitution provides that I![t]he Legislative power of the 
State shall be vested . . . [i]n a Senate and House of 
Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of the 
State of Utah." Utah Const., art. VI, section 1. The Constitution 
further expressly provides that fl[t]he powers of the government of 
the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted." The principle of separation of powers is a 
cornerstone of our system government at both the federal and state 
levels and the source of the doctrine of judicial restraint. See 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397-98 (Utah 1989); Jensen v. 
Matheson, 583 P.2d 77, 79 (Utah 1978); Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 
2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 380-81 (1970). 
Here, even under Day's theory of the case, the legislature has 
clearly expressed its desire not to provide a statutory remedy 
against the state. It is far outside the realm of judicial power 
to require the legislature to provide otherwise. 
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3, The exception to the state's immunity provided by 
section 63-30-7 is inseverable from the remainder 
of the Act 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to hold that section 63-
30-7(2) violates the open courts clause as urged by Day, that 
provision is inseverable from the remainder of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Where part of an enactment is 
unconstitutional, the severability question is primarily answered 
by determining legislative intent. Berry, 717 P.2d at 687; Salt 
Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 
(Utah 1977). To do so, the court must ask whether the balance of 
the enactment, other than the portion struck down, can stand alone 
and serve its legitimate legislative purpose. Utah Technology Fin. 
Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986); Berry, 717 P.2d 
at 687; State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, the Governmental Immunity Act legislatively 
adopted sovereign immunity, then waived that immunity in some 
circumstances, subject to certain exceptions. Section 63-30-7(2) 
constituted one of those exceptions. Those exceptions, including 
section 63-30-7(2), are an integral part of the enactment and are, 
therefore, not severable. Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of 
Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791; Berry, 717 P.2d at 686 (striking 
down entire Utah Product Liability Act as inseverable where section 
setting forth statute of repose violated open courts clause). The 
waiver of immunity and the exceptions to that waiver constitute a 
package and are inextricably interrelated. In such a circumstance, 
"it is not within the scope of the court's function to select the 
9 
valid portions of the act and make conjecture the legislature 
intended they should stand independent of the portions which are 
invalid." Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 
563 P.2d at 791. 
In any event, the legislative history of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, and particularly that of sections 63-30-3 and -7 as 
discussed in Point I.A. above, rules out any such conjecture. The 
Utah legislature plainly did not intend that the waiver provision 
of 63-30-7(1) would apply to a plaintiff in Day's position. 
Standing alone, the waiver provision cannot serve the legislature's 
purposes in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act. Accordingly, 
if this Court holds section 63-30-7(2) unconstitutional, the 
balance of the Act must also be invalidated. 
Absent any valid statutory waiver of sovereign immunity and 
statutory right of action, Day's ability to sue or recover from the 
state is controlled by the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. Under Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989) and McCorvey v. Utah State Department of 
Transportation, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah November 10, 1993), 
there is no common law right of action to recover anything from a 
governmental entity for injuries arising out of a governmental 
function. Day has conceded that Trooper Colyar was engaged in a 
governmental function in pursuing, and continuing to pursue, Floyd. 
Accordingly, Day has no common law claim against the state, and the 
judgment of the district court dismissing Day's claims must be 
affirmed. 
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In short, there is no "substitute" remedy under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act for the common law remedy Day claims 
existed against Trooper Colyar. Moreover, the open courts clause 
does not require the legislature to provide such a substitute 
remedy against the state. Furthermore, such a requirement would 
violate the fundamental precepts of separation of powers and 
judicial restraint. In any event, the exception to the Act's 
waiver of immunity contained in section 63-30-7(2) is inseverable 
from the remaining provisions of the Act and any ruling that 
section 63-30-7(2) is unconstitutional would require striking down 
the entire Act. Under the common law applicable to Day's claims, 
Day would have no remedy against the State. Therefore, this Court 
must affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing Day's claims. 
POINT II 











IMMUNE FROM DAY'S CLAIMS 
In pursuing, and continuing to pursue, Floyd, Trooper Colyar 
was performing a discretionary function for which he was immune at 
common law. Therefore, notwithstanding the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Day never had a remedy against Trooper Colyar. 
At common law, under the doctrine of official immunity, courts 
granted public employees such as Trooper Colyar extensive immunity 
from liability for actions taken within the scope of their 
employment. See, e.g.. Kendall v. Stokes. 44 U.S. 87 (1845) 
(holding postmaster general immune from liability for writing off 
debt owed to plaintiff); Hiorth v. Whittenburq, 121 Utah 324, 241 
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P.2d 907, 909 (1952) (holding state road commissioners immune from 
liability for property damages caused by decision to raise grade of 
road); Hicks v. Davis. 163 P. 799 (Utah 1917) (state auditor immune 
from liability for refusing to determine validity of claim against 
state); Garff v. Smith. 31 Utah 102, 86 P. 772 (1906) (holding 
state sheep inspector immune from liability for negligently 
ordering sheep quarantined under conditions that allegedly caused 
their death). 
Such immunity was based on the courts' recognition that a 
lawsuit against a governmental employee was often in effect a 
lawsuit against the state, and that, if held personally liable for 
their official judgments, responsible individuals would either be 
discouraged from accepting public employment or be unduly 
intimidated in carrying out their duties. See, e.g., Hiorth v. 
Whittenburg, 241 P.2d at 909 (stating public officials are immune 
from liability for discretionary decisions, "otherwise public 
officials would be fearful to act at the risk of finding themselves 
personally liable for acts done in good faith in the performance of 
their duties."); Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W. 2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992) 
(en banc) ("[T]he community imposes a duty on its governmental 
bodies and law enforcement officials to provide its citizens with 
security in person and property from lawless people, and this duty, 
on occasion, necessarily will involve high-speed car chases. 
Official immunity is provided because the community cannot expect 
its police officers to do their duty and then to second-guess them 
when they attempt conscientiously to do it. To expose police 
12 
officers to civil liability whenever a third person might be 
injured would, we think tend to exchange prudent caution for 
timidity in the already difficult job of responsible law 
enforcement.") 
One widely-applied type of official immunity at common law was 
based on the distinction between discretionary and ministerial 
functions. (Other common law immunity doctrines included the 
absolute immunity granted judicial officers and the good faith 
immunity generally accorded prison officials. See, e.g., Sheffield 
v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 369 (1968) 
(holding prison officials immune from negligence claims absent a 
wilful or malicious wrongful act).) Under the discretionary-
versus-ministerial function analysis, an official was held liable 
only for ministerial acts, but not for acts which required the 
exercise of discretion or judgment. See Fleming James, Jr., Tort 
Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 610, 643 (1955) ("The rule of immunity of officers for 
discretionary acts, and its extension, represent a judgment that 
the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the officer 
(especially since the prospect of actual compensation to the victim 
from that source is slight) are outweighed by the evils that would 
flow from a wider rule of liability."). 
For example, in Hiorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 
907, 909 (1952) , the court held members of the state road 
commission immune from liability for property damage caused by an 
allegedly negligent decision to substantially raise the grade of 
13 
state highway 89. In Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P. 2d 697, 699 
(Utah 1977) , on the other hand, the Utah Supreme Court held a 
district court clerk liable for failing to properly docket the 
payment of a fine, which resulted in the issuance of a bench 
warrant against and arrest of the plaintiff. 
Contrary to the suggestion in Day's reply brief at page 6, the 
doctrine of official immunity for discretionary acts was not a 
development of the 1920's and 1930's. Rather, the doctrine was 
well-developed and fully applied around the time of Utah's 
statehood in 1896. Just twelve years after statehood, for example, 
in Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 P. 772 (1906), the Utah Supreme 
Court held a state sheep inspector immune from liability for 
negligently ordering sheep quarantined under conditions that 
afforded insufficient food and pasture and allegedly resulted in 
their death. In so holding, the court stated: 
All the authorities agree that a public officer, acting 
judicially, or in a quasi judicial capacity, cannot be 
made personally liable in a civil action, unless the act 
complained of be willful, corrupt, or malicious, or 
without the jurisdiction of the officer. But, if the 
duties of the officer are merely ministerial, he is 
liable in a civil action when, in the performance of 
them, he acts negligently. These principles of law, of 
course, are conceded by [the sheep owner]. 
31 Utah at 107. Rejecting the sheep owner's argument that the 
inspector's actions were ministerial in nature, the court went on 
to state: 
It has been well said that: 
Official duty is ministerial when it is 
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving 
merely the execution of a set task, and when 
the law which imposes it prescribes and 
14 
defines the time, mode and occasion of its 
performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion. Official 
action is ministerial when it is the result of 
performing a certain and specific duty arising 
from fixed and designated facts. (People v. 
Bertels et al. , 138 111. 322, 27 N.E. 1091 
[(1891)] .) 
It has also been defined as follows: 
A ministerial act is one which a public 
officer is required to perform upon a given 
state of facts in a prescribed manner in 
obedience to the mandate of legal authority 
and without regard to his own judgment or 
opinion concerning the priority or impropriety 
of the act to be performed. (State ex rel. v. 
Meier, 143 Mo. 439, 45 S.W. 306 [(1898)].) 
31 Utah at 107-08 (additional citations omitted). 
Under the principles applied in Garff v. Smith, Trooper 
Colyar's pursuit of Floyd was clearly discretionary in nature. 
Therefore, under principles of the common law at the time of 
statehood, Trooper Colyar was immune from liability for Day's 
claims. 
These same common law principles were recently applied by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in holding a city police officer immune 
from liability in a high-speed chase of a shoplifter that resulted 
in the death of a seven-year old schoolboy who was struck by the 
fleeing car. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W. 2d 38 (Minn. 1992) (en 
banc). In so holding, the court noted that ff[t]he discretion 
involved in official immunity is different from the policymaking 
type of discretion involved in discretionary function immunity 
afforded governmental entities. Official immunity involves the 
kind of discretion which is exercised on an operational rather than 
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a policymaking level, and it requires something more than the 
performance of 'ministerial' duties." Id. at 40 (footnote 
omitted). Rejecting the parents' claim against the officer, the 
court reasoned: 
The decision to engage in a car chase and to 
continue the chase involves the weighing of many factors. 
How dangerous is the fleeing suspect and how important is 
it that he be caught? To what extent may the chase be 
dangerous to other persons because of weather, time of 
day, road, and traffic conditions? These and other 
questions must be resolved under emergency conditions 
with little time for reflection and often on the basis of 
incomplete and confusing information. It is difficult to 
think of a situation where the exercise of significant, 
independent judgment and discretion would be more 
required. 
Id. at 41. 
Based on the same reasoning, this Court should reject Day's 
contention that she had a common law remedy against Trooper Day and 
affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Day's complaint. 
The case of Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), relied 
upon by Day in oral argument before this Court, is not to the 
contrary. First, Frank was decided long after the adoption of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and thus does not represent the 
common law of Utah at the time of statehood. As stated by Justice 
Stewart in holding the product liability statute of repose 
unconstitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 
676 n. 3 (Utah 1985) , "To some extent . . . , the common law at the 
time of statehood provides a measure of the kinds of legal remedies 
that the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope if not in 
form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation." Thus, 
Day cannot rely on changes in the common law that occurred long 
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after statehood to establish a claim protected by the open courts 
clause. 
The holding of Frank that a state-employed psychologist was 
subject to liability in malpractice represented a major departure 
from the earlier common law of official immunity. In so holding, 
the court adopted and applied as a matter of common law the 
definition of a discretionary function used to determine the 
liability of governmental entities under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 613 P.2d at 520. ("There thus appears no reason to 
apply a different legal standard to the individual than that 
applied to the government employer, even though the latter is 
governed by statute and the former by common law principles . . . 
It is contrary to reason to deny governmental immunity to a 
public employer and then grant it to the very employee allegedly 
causing the injury.") Therefore, although the court recognized 
that the Act did not directly apply to claims against government 
employees, 613 P.2d at 520, the court's holding was strongly 
influenced by the Act. 
In interpreting the "discretionary function" exception of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah Supreme Court has followed 
the lead of cases interpreting section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. See Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282-83 (Utah 
1986) ; Little v. Div. of Family Serv. , 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) ; 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980). The difference in 
the meaning of the term "discretionary" under the FTCA and the 
common law was expressly recognized in Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 
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F. 2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971) . In Burks, the court rejected the 
argument that a Veterans' Administration hospital administrator and 
psychiatrist should be held liable for negligently permitting the 
escape of a mental patient, stating: 
Appellant urges that "discretion" means the same 
thing in the context of executive privilege as it does 
under the Tort Claims Act, where the government has been 
held liable for negligence in the treatment or custodial 
care of patients. 
We cannot agree that "discretion" can be read so 
narrowly as it is now under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
which has been liberally interpreted to provide a remedy 
against the government. The Act's liberal construction 
ought not to be extended to limit the immunity of federal 
employees. Liability of the government itself for wrongs 
committed by its employees will not have the same 
inhibiting effect on governmental operations as the 
personal liability of an official. The Tort Claims Act 
seeks to bar only those suits where the "discretion" is 
that involved in the formation of policy, rather than its 
operation. 
Id. at 234 (emphasis added) . Accordingly, the court held the 
hospital director immune and stating, " [w]hile Doctor Ging [the 
treating psychiatrist] had less discretion, nevertheless in her 
diagnoses and treatment of patients and in her supervisory powers 
over other employees she was vested with discretion. She is 
entitled to immunity from suit." Id. at 235. See also Pletan v. 
Gaines, 494 N.W.2d at 40 (en banc) (observing distinction between 
the discretion involved in official immunity and the policymaking 
type of discretion involved in discretionary function immunity 
afforded governmental entities in holding police officer immune 
from liability for child's death resulting collision with fleeing 
shoplifter in high-speed chase). 
Accordingly, the scope of the discretionary function exception 
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as applied to governmental entities under the both the FTCA the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act was far narrower than the common law 
immunity for discretionary functions accorded government employees. 
Indeed, contrary to the result in Frank, courts generally found 
government physicians immune at common law for medical malpractice 
and similar claims. See Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 F. 2d at 235; 
see also Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976) (Army 
surgeons immune from allegedly negligent performance of gall 
bladder operation on civilian); Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 
(6th Cir. 1952) (prison psychiatrist immune from liability for 
allegedly defamatory diagnosis of patient's mental condition).4 
Therefore, Frank effected a substantial change in the common 
law of official immunity as it was applied before the enactment of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Day's reliance on Frank to 
establish the existence of a remedy protected by the open courts 
clause is accordingly misplaced. 
Neither does the case of Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1977), support Day's claim of a common law remedy against 
Trooper Colyar. Cornwall involved a claim against a deputy sheriff 
4Cf. Brown v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, 395 
N.W.2d 18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (medical decisions are 
discretionary and protected by governmental immunity); but see 
Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting Federal 
Tort Claims Act definition of discretionary in holding Air Force 
physician liable on medical malpractice claim). As Jackson 
demonstrates, the interpretation of discretionary function under 
the FTCA also influenced the subsequent development of the law of 
federal official immunity. On the federal level, the issue of 
official immunity has been largely resolved by an amendment to the 
FTCA which expressly immunizes federal employees. See Federal 
Employee Liability Reform & Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 1988 
Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2679. 
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whose vehicle collided with the plaintiff's car. At the time of 
the collision, the deputy was traveling to the scene of an 
emergency, but contrary to section 41-6-14 of the Utah Code, failed 
to use his siren. The plaintiff alleged the deputy's conduct in 
failing to use either his vehicle lights or siren was "reckless, 
wilful, unlawful and in excess of his authority." Id. at 926. The 
court held that these allegations "appear [] to meet the criteria of 
wilfulness set forth in Sheffield v. Turner." Id. at 927 (citing 
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 369 
(1968) (holding prison officials immune from negligence claims 
absent a wilful or malicious wrongful act)). 
The court also stated that the deputy was performing a 
ministerial act. Id. at 927. Because the court held that the 
plaintiff's allegations satisfied the Sheffield standard of 
wilfulness or maliciousness, however, this statement was mere 
dicta. Even if the statement concerning ministerial acts were not 
dicta, however, it would not determine the issue here. First, the 
court's opinion in Cornwall was authored by former Chief Justice 
Hall, who also authored the opinion in Frank. Like Frank, Cornwall 
was decided long after the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was 
enacted and therefore does not represent the common law of Utah 
near the time of statehood. Justice Hall's statement in Cornwall 
simply presaged the holding three years later in Frank. As 
discussed above, that holding represented a substantial departure 
from the common law of official immunity near statehood. 
Second, Trooper Colyar's decision to pursue and to continue to 
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pursue Floyd is clearly distinguishable from the conduct of the 
deputy sheriff in Cornwall in driving to an emergency scene without 
using his lights or siren as expressly required by the motor 
vehicle code. Trooper Colyar's decision was more complex, and 
involved a far greater degree of judgment and discretion, than that 
of the deputy sheriff in Cornwall. Therefore, even if the conduct 
of the deputy sheriff in Cornwall were regarded as ministerial, 
that of Trooper Colyar was still clearly discretionary. Therefore, 
Cornwall does not support Day's claim that Trooper Colyar would 
have been held liable for her injuries at common law. 
In sum, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not deprive Day 
of any remedy she otherwise would have had at common law against 
Trooper Colyar. Under the common law doctrine of official immunity 
as applied in Utah at the time of statehood, Trooper Colyar's 
decision to pursue and to continue to pursue Floyd was a 
discretionary function for which he was granted immunity from 
liability. This Court should therefore affirm the decision below 
dismissing Day's claims. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Day seeks a remedy against the State that is 
unprotected by the open courts clause and therefore this Court 
should reject her constitutional challenge to section 63-30-7(2) of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. First, as discussed in Point 
II above, Day had no common law remedy against Trooper Colyar 
personally. 
Even if such a common law remedy existed, however, and that 
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remedy was abrogated by section 63-30-4(4) of the Act, the open 
courts clause would not support Day's claim of a substitute remedy 
against the state. Contrary to Day's assertion, the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act never provided such a substitute remedy; 
rather, the state has always been immune under the Act from 
liability for claims arising from the operation of emergency 
vehicles. Even if the Act did provide a "substitute" remedy 
against the state for Day's injuries, the open courts clause does 
not require the legislature to retain such a substitute remedy. 
Such a requirement would usurp the legislative function and violate 
fundamental notions of judicial restraint and separation of powers. 
Moreover, the exception to the state's waiver of immunity 
provided by section 63-30-7 is inseverable from the remainder of 
the Act. Therefore, if this Court were to hold section 63-30-7 
unconstitutional, it must strike down the entire Act. In that 
event, the state would be immune from Day's claims under the common 
law sovereign immunity principles. 
For all of these reasons, the judgment below dismissing Day's 
claims should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM 
1965 LAWS OF UTAH 139 
Section & General Immunity in Exercise of Governmental Functions. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental 
entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may re-
sult from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is en-
gaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. 
Section 7. Immunity Waived: Negligent Operation of Vehicle or 
Equipment by Agent—Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for in-
jury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a 
motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope of his employ-
ment; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to the oper-
ation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven 
in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 1961. 
